REMARKS/ARGUMENTS

The Applicant acknowledges, with thanks, the office action dated November 12, 2008. Examiner's withdrawal of the finality of the previous office action is noted with appreciation. By this amendment, independent claims 1, 17 and 24 have been amended. The subject matter of cryptographically binding the tunnel with the conversations inside the tunnel is not new matter as it is disclosed in paragraph 150 (Fig. 6, Ref. 685). Reconsideration of this amendment as amended is requested for reasons that will now be set forth.

Non-Art Matters

Claim 26 has been objected to because of informalities. Claim 26 has been amended to correct the informalities to which the Examiner objected. No new matter has been added. Applicant apologizes for not correcting this informality earlier.

Prior-Art Matters

Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 15-21, 24, 26, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0268126 to Dogan (*hereinafter*, "Dogan") in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,978,298 to Kuehr-McLaren (*hereinafter*, "Kuehr-McLaren") and Paul Funk, Simon Blake Wilson; "draft-ietf-eap-ttls-02.txt: EAP Tunneled TLS Authentication Protocol (EAP-TTLS)"; Internet-Draft PPPEXT Working Group; 30 Nov. 2002, pp. 1-40 (*hereinafter*, "Funk"). Claims 5-10 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Dogan in view of Kuehr-McLaren and Funk, and further in view of Downnard, Ian, "Public-key cryptography extensions into Kerberos", IEEE December 2002/January 2003, pp. 30-34 (*hereinafter*, "Downnard"). Withdrawal of these rejections is requested for reasons that will now be set forth.

Independent claim 1, as currently amended, recites a method or system for authenticating communication between a first and second party. A first secure tunnel is established between a peer and a server using asymmetric encryption in response to determining that a shared secret does not exist between the peer and the server. The shared secret is received via the first secure

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tunnel between the peer and the server and the secure tunnel is then torn down. A subsequent new secure tunnel is established between the peer and the server using symmetric encryption and the shared secret after tearing down the first tunnel and after the peer has received the shared secret. A tunnel key is mutually derived for the subsequent new secure tunnel using symmetric cryptography based on the shared secret in response to establishing the subsequent new secure tunnel. A relationship between the peer and the server is then authenticated within the subsequent secure tunnel. The subsequent new secure tunnel is then cryptographically bound with conversations inside the subsequent secure tunnel (which is recited in claim 25 as derive keying material that binds the subsequent new tunnel with all conversations inside the subsequent new tunnel). No new matter has been added as the amendments are supported by the original specification (see Figure 6, block 685 and ¶150). Independent claims 17 and 24 recite a system of claim 1.

By contrast, Dogan teaches shared secret generation for symmetric cryptography. A master secret is established between a first communications device and a second communications device. Then a connection is opened between the first communications device and the second communications device. A connection secret is generated from the master secret and used as a symmetric key during the life of the connection. However, Dogan does not teach or suggest receiving a shared secret via a first secure tunnel established between a peer and a server using asymmetric encryption. Symetric cryptography is based on the use of pre-shared secret. The parties obtain the secret through some protected external means. Asymmetric cryptography, on the other hand, is a zero knowledge approach and provides a higher level of security since a pre-shared secret is not relied on. Dogan teaches establishing a master secret in a fashion similar to exchanging a shared secret (see ¶23). A shared secret is exchanged using symmetric key cryptography (see ¶17). Further, Dogan teaches establishing the master secret during registration in one example (see ¶23). Thus, the master secret taught by Dogan is pre-shared. In contrast, claim 1 recites establishing a shared secret using asymmetric cryptography rather then using a pre-shared secret. This enables claim 1 to achieve a higher level of security.

Additionally, Dogan does not teach or suggest cryptographically binding a subsequent secure tunnel with conversations inside the tunnel as recited in claim 1. Cryptographic binding of the tunnel with the conversation inside the tunnel helps prevent man-in-the-middle attacks which enable an adversary to take control of information between a peer and a server. Dogan

does not address the prevention of such attacks. Thus, Dogan does not teach or suggest every element of claim 1.

The aforementioned deficiencies in Dogan are not remedied by any teachings of Kuehr-McLaren, Funk, or Downnard. Kuehr-McLaren teaches a method and apparatus for managing session information in a data processing system. A request for a secure connection is received. The secure connection is established, wherein information used to facilitate the secure connection is generated. The information is stored for a selected period of time, wherein the selected period of time is selected to optimize server resources. However, Kuehr-McLaren does not teach or suggest receiving a shared secret via a first secure tunnel established between a peer and a server using asymmetric encryption nor does Kuehr-McLaren teach or suggest cryptographically binding a subsequent secure tunnel with conversations inside the tunnel. Kuehr-McLaren is relied on by the Office Action to teach determining whether a shared secret exists between a peer and a server.

Funk teaches using asymmetric encryption for establishing tunnels and the authenticating within the tunnel. However, Funk does not teach or suggest establishing a first secure tunnel using asymmetric encryption to receive a shared secret for use in subsequent authentications nor does Funk teach or suggest cryptographically binding a subsequent secure tunnel with conversations inside the tunnel.

Downnard teaches public key cryptography extensions into Kerberos. However, Downnard does not teach or suggest establishing a first secure tunnel using asymmetric encryption to receive a shared secret for use in subsequent authentications nor does Funk teach or suggest cryptographically binding a subsequent secure tunnel with conversations inside the tunnel. Downnard is relied on by the Office Action to teach the shared secret being a protected access credential.

Thus, neither Dogan, Kuehr-McLaren, Funk, nor Downnard, alone or in combination, teach or suggest each and every element of independent claims 1, 17 and 24. Therefore, for the reasons set forth, withdrawal of these rejections is respectfully requested.

Claims 2, 5-10, 15-16, and 27 depend directly from claim 1 and therefore contain each and every element of claim 1. Claims 18-21 depend directly from claim 17 and therefore contain each and every element of claim 17. Claim 26 depends directly from claim 24 and therefore contains each and every element of claim 24. Therefore, for the reasons already set forth for

claims 1, 17, and 24, withdrawal of rejections of claims 2, 5-10, 15-16, 18-21, and 26-27 is respectfully requested.

Conclusion

Withdrawal of the rejections to this application is requested for the reasons set forth herein and a Notice of Allowance is earnestly solicited. If there are any fees necessitated by the foregoing communication, the Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge such fees to our Deposit Account No. 50-0902, referencing our Docket No. 72255/00010.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: *1-28-2009*

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